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Right to Counsel
Before Arraignment
William M. Beaney*
INTRODUCTION
A fascinating aspect of the study of legal institutions is the task
of identifying legal doctrines or practices that are in the process of
rapid change. Normally, a search is most fruitful when one concentrates on those rules or procedures that adversely affect an important and usually vocal group within society, a group that is seeking to express its political power initially through the ballot and
eventually through new legislation. The ultimate triumph of workmen's compensation laws and legal recognition of the right of collective bargaining are obvious examples of this type of legal change.
Less striking, but in many ways more revealing of the value system
of a society, are changes in law not produced by political action
expressing group or class interests. Changes in the criminal law,
such as the abolition of the death penalty in many jurisdictions, the
development of parole and rehabilitation practices, and efforts to
increase the fairness of the criminal trial are clearly of this latter
nature. So too, is the increasing concern with the responsibility of
the state to determine when an accused should have counseland, more particularly, whether the assistance of counsel should
arise at a stage preceding arraignment for the purpose of pleading
to the information or indictment-the particular question to be
examined here.'.
I. THE BACKGROUND
To appreciate the nature of the issue, the problem of when an
accused should have counsel must be placed in the context of the
history of the right to counsel itself. It should be remembered that
*Professor of Politics, Princeton University.

1. The term "preliminary hearing" is used throughout this article to re-

fer to the proceeding following arrest when a felony defendant is taken be-

fore a magistrate who determines whether or not there is sufficient evidence to warrant holding the defendant for further action, sets bail, and
advises the defendant concerning his rights. Throughout this paper no reference will be made to the problems of a defendant in misdemeanor cases
where denial of appointed counsel is customary in the United States. For
an excellent discussion of this problem, see Rahl, The Right to Counsel In
Misdemeanor Cases,48 CALIF. L. REv. 501 (1960).
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the English common law was not particularly solicitous of the rights
of a criminal defendant; indeed, he was denied the right to have retained counsel represent him fully in felony cases until 1836,2
although those accused of treason had been granted a right to appointed counsel as early as 1695.' In the United States, defendants were allowed to be represented by retained counsel from precolonial times, and the provisions in the Bill of Rights and in state
constitutions confirmed that practice.' With respect to appointed
counsel, state law and practice have varied widely-all states
showing a tendency in the present century to appoint counsel for
indigents charged with capital offenses, and a large number providing for appointment even in noncapital felonies.' In both capital and noncapital cases, however, appointment was often more
formal than real. It was not until the 1932 decision of Powell v.
Alabama6 that the Supreme Court ruled that the states have a
constitutional duty to see that an effective appointment of counsel
is made in certain circumstances to ensure a fair trial. Subsequently, appointment of counsel was made mandatory in state
capital cases, 7 but where lesser felonies are charged, appointment
is necessary only where failure to appoint alone, or in combination
with other circumstances, appears in retrospect to have resulted in
a trial lacking fundamental fairness.'
The Supreme Court also has held that the denial of counsel at
some stage before trial may produce an element of unfairness
amounting to a denial of due process.' The most obvious challenge
that arises is a confession made after an arrested person's request
for counsel is denied.'" In a number of cases the Supreme Court
has held that absence of counsel was one factor which tended to
2. 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 114, § 1 (1836). For a survey of the historical background see, BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS,

ch. 2 (1955). An excellent brief account of the counsel problem is FELLMAN, THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS, ch. 7 (1958).
3. 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 3, § 1 (1695).
4. See BEANEY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 14-29.
5. The provisions are summarized in BEANEY, op. cit. supra note 2,
ch. 4 and Fellman, The Right to Counsel Under State Lmv, 1955 Wis. L.
REv. 281.
6.287 U.S. 45 (1932).
7. De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947); Tomkins v. Missouri,
323 U.S. 485 (1945); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945).
8. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
9. Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958). The specific comment
to this effect occurs at 357 U.S. at 439. No decision has yet gone so far.

The "unfairness" does not arise from the absence of counsel alone but
must take some other form.

10. See, e.g., Crooker v. California, supra note 9; Cicenia v. Lagay,
357 U.S. 504 (1958); Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952). However,

in each case the vital confession was held ddmissible.
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show the involuntary nature of the confession."1 But the clearest
decisions involving specific denial of a request for counsel arose
during the 1956 and 1958 terms of the Court. The 1956 decision, In re Groban,' seemingly is only of peripheral significance
to our topic, but further examination reveals that it cuts deeper.
In a 5 to 4 decision, the Court upheld the validity of an Ohio administrative proceeding in which a firewarden interviewed Groban
in secret and denied his request that counsel be present at the
hearing. The majority emphasized that an inquiry into the causes
of fires was essentially an administrative proceeding. Justices Harlan and Frankfurter, in a concurring opinion, emphasized that the
proceeding was nonprosecutorial, and stated that their concurrence did not imply that "secret inquisitorial powers given to a
District Attorney would also have to be sustained."'" The dissenters viewed the investigating firewarden as a law-enforcement
officer, and argued that compelling a person to appear alone before any law-enforcement officer to give testimony against his will
violated the due process guarantee of the right to counsel. Mr.
Justice Black stated flatly, "I . . . firmly believe that the Due
Process Clause requires that a person interrogated be allowed to
use legal counsel whenever he is compelled to give testimony to
law-enforcement officers which may be instrumental in his prosecution for a criminal offense.""' However, it should be made clear
that the question presented in Groban concerned only the right
to the services of retained counsel.
The problem of when the right to counsel begins was presented
more clearly in two cases-Crooker v. Californiae and Cicenia
v. Lagay 6 -decided by the Supreme Court in 1958. In both cases
the claim to the right was denied, five to four; Justices Douglas,
Black, Brennan and the Chief Justice dissented in Crooker, and
all but Mr. Justice Brennan, who did not participate, dissented in
Cicenia. In Crooker a 31-year-old college graduate, with one year
of law school training, confessed to murder after being interro11. In those cases in which lack of counsel has been viewed as one ele-

ment tending to show the involuntary quality of the confession, so many
other elements were present that it is impossible to assign any specific

weight to the counsel factor. See, e.g., Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191
(1957); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S.
49 (1949); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948). Fikes, supra, involved a
confession after the defendant's father and his lawyer were barred from seeing him, but there are other factors that sufficiently explain the ruling of inadmissibility.
12. 352 U.S. 330 (1957).
13. Id. at 337.
14. Id. at 344.
15. 357 U.S. 433 (1958). For case comments, see 44 A.B.A.J. 1080
(1958); 107 U. PA. L. REV. 286 (1958); 33 TUL. L. REv. 221 (1958).

16. 357 U.S. 504 (1958).
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gated in three periods from 8:30 p.m. to 2 a.m. At the outset he
asked at least twice if he could call a named attorney, but was told
that he could do so only at the conclusion of the investigation.
The rather brief opinion of the Court by Mr. Justice Clark applied
the "fair trial" rule and found that the denial of the request for
counsel had not prejudiced the defendant so as to "infect his subsequent trial with an absence of 'that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice.' "'I
In Cicenia, a similar ruling was expressed. In this case, New
Jersey authorities had refused to permit a retained lawyer, who
had counseled the defendant on the evening before the latter appeared at police headquarters, to talk to his client until police
questioning was finished. A period of seven and one-half hours
elapsed between the time of the lawyer's request to see his client
and the granting of access. Mr. Justice Harlan, writing for the
Court, found no lack of fundamental fairness, and reiterated that
lack of counsel is only one pertinent element in determining whether a trial is unfair. An interesting feature of Cicenia is the fact
that the lawyer who advised the defendant to report to the police
station for questioning either chose not to instruct the defendant to
refuse to answer questions or gave instructions that were not heeded. As the Supreme Court itself has suggested, injection of a lawyer into most situations where interrogation is needed by law-enforcement officers supposedly means that the accused will not
talk.'8
The position of the dissenters in Crooker and Cicenia is clear.
Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion in Crooker, after pointing out the
various functions of counsel at the pre-trial stage, ends on this
clear note that "the demands of our civilization expressed in the
Due Process Clause require that the accused who wants a counsel
should have one at any time after the moment of arrest."" In a
footnote, Mr. Justice Douglas quoted a provision (section 825) of
the California Penal Code' which provides that after an arrest,
''any attorney at law . . . may at the request of the prisoner or
any relative of the prisoner . . . visit the person so arrested." The
17. 357 U.S. 433, 439 (1958).
18.

To bring in a lawyer means a real peril to solution of the crime, because, under our adversary system, he deems that his sole duty is to

protect his client-guilty or not-and that in such a capacity he owes
no duty whatever to help society solve its crime problem. Under this

conception of criminal procedure, any lawyer worth his salt will tell

the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no statement to police under any circumstances.

Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring, in Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59
(1949).
19. 357 U.S.433,448 (1958).

20. Id. at 448 n.4.
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provision makes refusal to admit an attorney a misdemeanor, with
a forfeiture of $500 to the aggrieved person.
There are two aspects of the majority's holding that should be
clarified. After citing a line of cases in which the confession made
by indigent defendants before appointment of counsel had been
held inadmissible, Mr. Justice Clark said, "To be sure, coercion
seems more likely to result from the state denial of a specific request for opportunity to engage counsel than it does from state
failure to appoint counsel immediately upon arrest" and then concluded that this possibility was negated in the present case "by
petitioner's age, intelligence, and education. '21 This, of course,
means that denying access to counsel to a less intelligent or less
experienced defendant may produce a different result. It is the old
case-by-case method of review that has existed ever since the
"fair trial" rule was adopted. A related aspect is this: the Court
refrained from designating the time when the right to retain
counsel arises. This is consistent with the rule of Betts v. Brady,2
which permits a trial of a noncapital offense without counsel where
the defendant is confronted by a relatively simple charge and the
defendant is reasonably intelligent and experienced, and no injustice is done.
In the second place, the Court at least intimates that a different
rule might be applied to federal cases. At one point, Mr. Justice
Clark refers to the petitioner's claim that the Court should bar
any confession made after denial of a request to notify counsel,
even if made voluntarily, and even if the denial of counsel did not
constitute a violation of the due process right to counsel.' Mr.
Justice Clark terms this "an appeal to the supervisory power of
24
this Court over the administration of justice in the federal case," '
and simply notes that this was a state conviction. In Cicenia, Mr.
Justice Harlan more explicitly expressed his "strong distaste," and
stated that "were this a federal prosecution we would have little
difficulty in dealing with what occurred under our general supervisory power over the administration of justice."' ' It is true that
there is no federal rule specifically requiring access to counsel,
and it is not until the appearance before a commissioner that the
defendant must be advised of his right to retain counsel and have
a reasonable opportunity to consult him. 26 But it would be difficult to argue that the failure to take an arrested person before a
commissioner "without unnecessary delay" should be given greater
21. Id. at 438.
22. 316 U.S.455 (1942).
23. 357 U.S.433, 439 n.4 (1958).
24. Ibid.
25. 357 U.S.504, 508-09 (1958).
26. FED.R.CIuM. P.5(b).
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significance than refusal to afford the defendant access to counsel,
and this is obviously what Mr. Justice Harlan had in mind.
II.

A.

WHEN THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL ARISES

IN FEDERAL COURTS

It has been generally held in the federal courts that an indigent
defendant's right to counsel arises at the arraignment on the plea.
The practice in most federal districts is to appoint counsel relatively soon after indictment in serious cases, and somewhat later
where lesser offenses are charged. It seems likely, although no
cases can be cited, that refusal to allow retained counsel to participate at the commissioner's hearing, or at any subsequent time
would render inadmissible any confession made subsequent to such
denial. And as suggested previously, the Court might well exercise
its supervisory powers to exclude confessions made after denial of
access to retained counsel before appearance before the commissioner for the same reasons that the Court excluded confessions in
McNabb v. United States2 7 and Mallory v. United States.28

B.

STATE PROCEEDINGS

The application of the "fair trial" rule does not require the appointment of counsel even at the trial of an indigent defendant in
every noncapital case. Absence of counsel at a stage preceding
trial may affect the admissibility of a confession and in general
will cause a reversal of a conviction if the totality of circumstances,
including the personal characteristics of the defendant, when
viewed in retrospect, indicate a fundamental unfairness in the proceeding that resulted in conviction. 29 Most state rules or statutory
provisions providing for appointment of counsel in capital or noncapital cases make arraignment on the plea the decisive moment.
And as previously explained, appointment at that stage with a
reasonable opportunity for counsel to prepare for trial satisfies the
due process requirement except where exceptional circumstances
exist. 3
27. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
28. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
29. See cases cited note 11 supra.

30. The Michigan Supreme Court has held inadmissible a confession
made after a time when a defendant could and should have had his preliminary hearing. People v. Hamilton, 359 Mich. 410, 102 N.W.2d 738
(1960). The charge was murder and a lawyer was denied access to the defendant. In addition, the youthful foreign-born defendant knew few English words. The basis of the decision, however, seems to be the courts
equating of the relevant Michigan rules and constitutional provisions with
the FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a), which requires a prompt hearing before a com-
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With respect to retained counsel, many states make provision
for advising the defendant of his right at the preliminary hearing.3
Some police departments or prosecutors have a policy of permitting
one or two telephone calls by the defendant after it has been decided to book him,32 and in some instances he will be given specific
advice that counsel may be retained and will be permitted to see
him." But as Crooker and Cicenia show, an accused under arrest has no right to see his counsel while the police are carrying
on interrogation or investigation.
If the interrogation of the accused takes place after indictment,
however, a different rule becomes effective. In People v. Spano,3"
the defendant, suspected of murder, was taken into custody on a
bench warrant issued after indictment. The defendant, who had
been counseled by his lawyer to say nothing to the authorities,
was intensively questioned by an assistant district attorney and
others in the period following his surrender. An old friend, presently a member of the New York City police department, helped
induce a confession by asserting that the officer would be in trouble with his superior if the defendant failed to confess. The defendant's requests that he be allowed to see his lawyer were denied. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the conviction and
the admissibility of confession, four to three. Judge Desmond,
writing for the dissenters, emphasized the difference between this
and the typical case-the interrogation here took place after indictment. In his view, the defendant could not be compelled to testify against himself, and had the right to the assistance of counsel
at every stage of the proceedings.
The United States Supreme Court unanimously reversed, but
the Court disagreed as to the grounds for reversal.3 The Chief
Justice and four other Justices found the confession inadmissible
because of the total circumstances in which it was produced. Justices Douglas, Black, Brennan and Stewart, speaking through Mr.
Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Stewart viewed the refusal to grant
access to retained counsel in a capital case after indictment as
fatal, wholly apart from the question of whether the confession
missioner and which was applied in Mallory so as to exclude a confession
made after the time when the accused should have appeared before a commissioner.

31. See statutes cited in BEAINEY, op. cit. supra note 2, at 86 n.30.
32. Practices vary widely as revealed by police officials in interviews
with the writer. The difficulty of drawing conclusions about these matters

arises from the different treatment afforded defendants by the same department depending on the nature of the offense and the reputation and
other characteristics of the particular suspect.
33. E.g., REvISED DETRorr POLICE MANUAL, C. 16, § 61 (1955).
34. 4 N.Y.2d 256, 150 N.E.2d 226, 173 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1958).

35. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
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was improperly induced. This would seemingly indicate that a
majority of the Court would support the proposition that at least
after indictment it is a denial of due process in a capital case to
refuse a defendant's request to see his lawyer, since Chief Justice
Warren had taken an even more extreme position in the earlier
Crooker and Cicenia cases-a denial of access even after arrest
violated the due process standard.
The concurring opinions in Spano significantly influenced later
New York state law respecting the right to counsel. In People v.
DiBiasi,38 the court of appeals, in reversing a murder conviction,
held that it is a violation of the right to counsel to question a defendant after conviction in the absence of his retained counsel
even though he neither asked for, nor was denied, permission to
consult with his lawyer. The facts seemed to show that the defendant made willing responses to all of the questions of police officers
and an assistant district attorney. The difference between the facts
of this case and Spano was stressed vainly by Justice Dye for the
3
dissentersY.
A logical extension of this doctrine would be the denial of the right to question an indigent defendant who lacks appointed counsel after indictment. 8 In fact a later decision of the
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held precisely this,
three to two, where a defendant charged with murder confessed
after indictment without being offered the assistance of appointed
counsel. 9 This decision may represent a position far in advance
of that which a majority of the United States Supreme Court is
prepared to take, but the decision in Spano suggests the present
weakness of Betts v. Brady. It seems impossible to justify the right
of access to retained counsel at every stage after indictment in a
capital case, while permitting an indigent defendant to be tried
without counsel in many noncapital cases. The capital, noncapital distinction is wholly lacking in substance in view of the incapacity of laymen to grasp even simple points of law, and the relative simplicity of the legal issues in many capital crimes as compared with the often difficult issues of noncapital offenses.
III.

PRACTICE AND POLICY

The counsel problem is a fascinating chapter in the changing
law of society for several obvious reasons. In few other situations
36. 7 N.Y.2d 544, 166 N.E.2d 825, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1960).
37. For a careful analysis of DiBiasi and the other New York cases,
see Rothblatt & Rothblatt, Police Interrogation: The Right to Counsel and
to Prompt Arraignment, 27 BROOKLYN L. REv. 24 (1960).
38. This is suggested in Note, Post-Indictment Questioning in Absence of
Counsel Violates Due Process Requirements, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 744, 748
(1961).

39. People v. Waterman, 12 App. Div. 2d 84, 208 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1960).
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are the judges so directly aware of the conflicting interests involved.
Moreover, this is an area where the judges must assume responsibility if substantial changes are to occur, since it is unlikely that
legislatures will show much interest in this subject. In addition,
there is dogged resistance from a relatively vocal group of professional law-enforcement organizations to any change that favors the
accused. Yet there are signs of a gradual, if erratic, trend toward a
more generous treatment of defendants before trial, in spite of the
fact that defendants may still be denied appointment of counsel in
a noncapital state trial. Such improvement is not likely to result
from a balancing of interests, with a finding that the social and individual interests in full protection outweighs the social interest in
convicting more defendants. Rather, it will result from an awareness that the present "fair trial" rule as applied is illogical, and
the illogic of its application becomes more obvious with each case.
In addition, the present system of generally denying counsel until
arraignment on the plea is patently unfair to the defense.
The illogic of the "fair trial" rule as applied is that it provides
a "right" that is incapable of reasonably precise definition, so that
neither law-enforcement officers nor the defendant know what
each owes to the other, and second, it is almost wholly retrospective in application. It is true that many of the law's commands
must be couched in the loose formula of the reasonable man or
the test of reason, but a guarantee that a man shall not be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law seems capable of stricter definition.
Mr. Justice Clark suggests the fragile nature of the "fair trial"
rule in Crooker when he admits that "the least change of circumstances may provide or eliminate fundamental fairness.""0 In
Crooker, the man was a 31-year-old college graduate who had
completed one year of law school. It seems clear that he knew he
was not required to answer questions, and appears to have been
a rather sophisticated defendant. These personal characteristics of
the defendant seem to have been an important ingredient in Mr.
Justice Clark's opinion in Crooker, yet in Cicenia we learn nothing
of the defendant's characteristics. His age, education and knowledge or ignorance of his rights while undergoing interrogation are
not discussed in Mr. Justice Harlan's opinion, and we have no
report of any of the opinions in the New Jersey courts. The rule
that emerges from these two cases seems to be one permitting denial of access to counsel for an unlimited time, so long as a confession is sought and obtained without excessive pressure. Or is the
more than seven hours denial in Cicenia near the permissible
40. 357 U.S. at 441 n.6.
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limit? It is difficult to see that anyone can have an adequate conception of the duties of law-enforcement officials and the rights
of defendants from these two decisions and the previous rulings
of the Supreme Court.
The unfairness of the present state of the law to a defendant is
obvious. He needs a safeguard against overzealous prosecution
and an opportunity to prepare adequately for his defense. The
public would be outraged by a disclosure that a prosecutor or a
police officer had allowed two weeks to elapse before undertaking
a thorough investigation of the facts of a case, including the interrogation of the suspect and all available witnesses and such
scientific tests as the nature of the case permits. In New Jersey,
which uses a system of appointment from an alphabetical list of
practicing attorneys, a 1955 study illustrated that the courts in 16
of 21 counties appointed counsel at or after arraignment. In 13
of these counties (those where data was available) the minimum
interval between arrest and appointment in jail cases varied from
one day to 25 days, and the maximum varied between seven and
180 days, with the average being about 70 days. 1 A rule added in
1953 does provide that "whenever practicable counsel shall be assigned before arraignment," but its wording suggests its shortcomings." A study of a New York county showed a delay of three
months before assignment in some cases. 3 Under the "fair trial"
rule as presently applied, extended delay in making appointment
will not be viewed as a violation of due process, unless there is
some special circumstance showing unfairness. But what is argued
here is that the delay in itself is a serious element of unfairness, a
proposition that can be tested by asking what would be the reaction of any defendant with means to retain counsel and what
would be his counsel's attitude if he were forced to forego the
privilege of representation until a week or more had elapsed? This
basic unfairness may permeate many trials but without resulting in
the kind of tangible evidence of impropriety needed under the
"fair trial" rule. The possible defense witness who is never found,
the prosecution witness' story that might have been different if the
defense had obtained an early interview, suggest the range of various "might have been" factors aiding the defense which are eliminated by the tardy appointment of counsel. And when an appellate
court determines that a trial is not lacking in fundamental fairness it
41. N.J. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, REPORT ON THE
ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEM 6 (1955).
42. N.J. RULES 1:12-9(a) (Supp. 1960).
43. SPECIAL COMM. OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR Ass'N, EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE ACCUSED 67 (1959). This splendid report should be read in
its entirety. It effectively documents the shortcomings of the present system
of providing counsel for indigent defendants.
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must of necessity overlook the possible unseen harm of this nature
suffered by the defendant. Only if the defense has an opportunity
to prepare for trial substantially equal to that enjoyed by the prosecution can a criminal proceeding be considered fair in any realistic
sense. This in turn means that counsel, whether retained or appointed, must have access to the accused soon after arrest.
CONCLUSION
What is needed in federal courts through a new federal rule,
and in state proceedings under the existing "fair trial" rule, or a
less ambiguous standard, is a requirement that defines specifically
the time when both retained and appointed counsel may see a defendant. If, as the Special Committee of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York concluded, that "representation must
be provided early if it is to be effective,"" the problem is to determine when is "early" enough. It is suggested that the obtaining
of counsel at the preliminary hearing, assuming it is held without
unnecessary delay, is the minimum protection needed by the defendant. As a corollary, waiver of counsel by an undefended accused at a preliminary hearing should not be permitted. For indigent defendants there is great difficulty in envisaging an earlier
time of appointment without relying on the police in a way that
hardly seems feasible at present. In fact, a system of appointment
at the time of preliminary hearing is meaningful only if there is
some institutionalized method of furnishing counsel, such as the
Voluntary Defender or Public Defender systems, both of which at
present provide representation at a far earlier stage of proceedings
than does the more prevalent system of ad hoc assigned counsel.45
The New York City Bar Report found that the Criminal Courts
Branch of the Legal Aid Society generally began representation
within two to three days after arrest46 and that the Public Defender of Almeda County, California interviews an indigent de7
fendant within two days after arrest.
With respect to access by retained counsel, a rule requiring that
defendant may obtain counsel, and making it a misdemeanor to bar
counsel, although ignored by the California enforcement officials
in Crooker, seems eminently satisfactory-if a more effective sanction can be found. Clearly, an effort by the states to provide an
44. Id. at 60.
45. Id. at 71, 74. It would appear that the only feasible method by

which assigned counsel could be injected into the proceeding at the time of

the preliminary hearing would require that the police promptly notify the
appointing official after the "booking." There is little disposition on the part

of the police to undertake such a function.
46. Id. at 71.
47. Id. at 74.
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effective system of appointed counsel and one that would come
into operation at an earlier time would be a more satisfactory solution than a rule devised by the United Staies Supreme Court. But
the failure of the states to take this step should hardly be a reason
for Supreme Court acceptance of the present situation. The only
effective sanction that exists is that of holding inadmissible a
confession made after a denial of access to counsel, and it is suggested, a similar view should be taken of confessions obtained after failure to appoint counsel within a 48 to 72 hour period after
arrest.
This would hardly affect the power of the police and prosecution to interrogate suspects following arrest to determine if they are
to be charged, nor would it exclude confessions obtained as the
result of such questioning. What the new rule would accomplish
is the banning of protracted detention incommunicado and the
suction method of interrogation. The positive value is the assurance of a reasonable opportunity for an adequate defense in criminal cases. It may be seriously doubted whether competent police
officers and vigorous prosecutors would be seriously handicapped
by this rule. And if it has the side effect of raising the standards of
law-enforcement officials, it will have achieved an additional important purpose.
This proposed change in the law will hardly eliminate all shortcomings from federal and state trials, but it will advance us one
important step to the ideal of equal justice under law.

